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The Robertson Panel was a scientific committee which met in January 1953. The Panel arose from a recommendation to the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) in December 1952 from a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) review of the U.S. Air Force investigation into unidentified flying objects, project Blue Book.〔Minutes of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, 4th December 1952, IAC-M-90〕 The CIA review itself was in response to widespread reports of unidentified flying objects, especially in the Washington, D.C. area during the summer of 1952. The panel was briefed on U.S. military activities and intelligence; hence the report was originally classified Secret. Later declassified, the Robertson Panel's report concluded that UFOs were not a direct threat to national security, but could pose an indirect threat by overwhelming standard military communications due to public interest in the subject. Most UFO reports, they concluded, could be explained as misidentification of mundane aerial objects, and the remaining minority could, in all likelihood, be similarly explained with further study. The Robertson Panel recommended that a public education campaign should be undertaken in order to reduce public interest in the subject, minimising the risk of swamping Air Defence systems with reports at critical times, and that civilian UFO groups should be monitored.〔Memorandum for the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence from F C Durant, ‘Report of Meetings of the Office of Scientific Intelligence Scientific Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects, January 14–18, 1953, 16th February 1953.〕 The Robertson Panel’s report was contained within a larger internal CIA report by F C Durant, a CIA officer who served as Secretary to the Panel, which summarises the activities of the panel and its conclusions. This wider document is commonly referred to as the Durant Report.〔 ==Background to the formation of the Robertson Panel== In 1952 there was a significant increase in the number of UFO reports received by the USAF Blue Book project, tasked with investigating such reports at the time. This wave included widely reported incidents over Washington DC in July, over the weekends of July 19-20 and 26th-27th. CIA historian Gerald Haines noted “A massive build-up of sightings over the United States in 1952, especially in July, alarmed the Truman administration. On 19 and 20 July, radar scopes at Washington National Airport and Andrews Air Force Base tracked mysterious blips. On 27 July, the blips reappeared. The Air Force scrambled interceptor aircraft to investigate, but they found nothing. The incidents, however, caused headlines across the country. The White House wanted to know what was happening…”.〔Haines, G. K., 1997, ‘The CIA’s Role in the Study of UFOs”, Studies in Intelligence, pp67-84, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/ufo.html〕 The reference to White House interest is consistent with a telephone call Captain (later Major) Edward Ruppelt, Blue Book Project Director at the time, received from Brigadier General Landry, Truman’s military aide, on the 28th July, inquiring as to the causes of the Washington reports of the previous days.〔Ruppelt, E., 1956, Report on Unidentified Flying Objects, Doubleday.〕 In a 29 July 1952 memo to the Deputy Director of Intelligence, Acting Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence Ralph Clark commented; “In the past several weeks a number of radar and visual sightings of unidentified aerial objects have been reported. Although this office has maintained a continuing review of such reported sightings during the past three years, a special study group has been formed to review this subject to date. D/CI will participate in the study with D/SI and a report should be ready about 15 August.” 〔Memorandum for the Deputy Director / Intelligence from Ralph Clark, ‘Recent sightings of unexplained objects’, 29th July 1952〕 This is the earliest written record of the CIA study which led to the Robertson Panel. The precise origins of the decision to establish the review are unclear. A claim that the study was initiated by a Presidential request to the National Security Council (NSC) appears to be incorrect. No NSC meetings were held on the relevant dates 〔List of NSC meetings in the Truman administration: http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/Truman_Admin.pdf〕 and the President was in Kansas on the 27 and 28 July, resting after attending the Democratic Party convention on the 26th.〔Log of President Truman's appointments: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/main.php?currYear=1952&currMonth=7&currDay=28〕 The Ralph L Clark memo of the 29th July contains a footnote reference to a meeting, “OSI:FCD:RLC mtw (28July52)” which appears to indicate a 28 July 1952 meeting between F C Durant and Clark on this subject. The decision to initiate the CIA study appears therefore to have been taken around the 28th July, although D/CI (Director of Central Intelligence) involvement in the study and Haines’ reference to White House interest suggests that the FCD:RLC meeting was not itself the formal decision point. The decision appears to have been an operational decision taken outside of formal structures such as NSC meetings, as was common for urgent matters. The CIA analysts were broadly sceptical concerning the possibility that some UFO reports may represent extraterrestrial objects or objects of terrestrial (either American or Russian) manufacture, favouring the hypothesis that currently unidentified reports were misidentifications of conventional objects or natural phenomena. In an internal CIA paper dated 19 August 1952 the analyst notes:
These twin concerns – potential for psychological warfare and overloading of air defence systems, were formalised in a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith on the 11th September 1952.〔CIA memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence from H Marshall Chadwell, 11th September 1952, ‘Flying Saucers’.〕 This memorandum noted that although the Air Force study was adequate on a case by case basis it was not addressing the more fundamental question of enabling rapid positive identification of reports; “…the study makes no attempt to solve the more fundamental aspect of the problem which is to determine definitely the nature of the various phenomena which are causing these sightings, or to discover means by which these causes and their visual and electronic effects may be immediately identified. Our consultant panel stated that these solutions would probably be found on the margins or just beyond the frontiers of our present phenomena”. The memorandum went on to make the recommendations: a. The Director of Central Intelligence advise the National Security Council of the security implications inherent in the flying saucer problem with the request that, under his statutory coordinating authority, The Director of Central Intelligence be empowered to institute through the appropriate agencies, either within or without the government, the investigation and research necessary to solve the problem of instant positive identification of "unidentified flying objects". On the 13th October 1952, however, a memorandum from the Assistant Director for Intelligence Co-ordination, James Reber to the Deputy Director Intelligence argued that fundamental research into the question of positive identification was the responsibility of the Defence Department and that whilst investigating Soviet knowledge of the phenomena was a “primary concern” for the CIA it “is far too early in view of the present state of our knowledge regarding Flying Saucers for psychological warfare planners to start planning how the United States might use U.S. Flying Saucers against the enemy”. Reber went on to recommend that when “…intelligence has submitted the National Estimate on Flying Saucers there will be the time and basis for a public policy to reduce or restrain mass hysteria.”〔CIA memorandum to Deputy Director / Intelligence from James Q Reber, 13th October 1952.〕 As early as the 15th August CIA analysts, despite their overall sceptical conclusions had noted, “Sightings of UFO's reported at Los Alamos and Oak Ridge, at a time when the background radiation count had risen inexplicably. Here we run out of even "blue yonder" explanations that might be tenable, and, we still are left with numbers of incredible reports from credible observers.”〔CIA memorandum, unsigned, 15th August 1952, ‘DRAFT: 15th August 1952”, http://www.cufon.org/cufon/cia-52-1.htm〕 On the 2nd December 1952 CIA Assistant Director Chadwell noted, “Recent reports reaching CIA indicated that further action was desirable and another briefing by the cognizant A-2 and ATIC personnel was held on 25 November. At this time, the reports of incidents convince us that there is something going on that must have immediate attention. The details of some of these incidents have been discussed by AD/SI with DDCI. Sightings of unexplained objects at great altitudes and traveling at high speeds in the vicinity of major U.S. defense installations are of such nature that they are not attributable to natural phenomena or known types of aerial vehicles”.〔CIA memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence from H Marshall Chadwell, 2nd December 1952, ‘Unidentified Flying Objects’.〕 Chadwell’s 2 December memorandum contained the draft of recommendations for the NSC, which were: 1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall formulate and carry out a program of intelligence and research activities as required to solve the problem of instant positive identification of unidentified flying objects. On the 4th December 1952 the Intelligence Advisory Committee agreed: The Director of Central Intelligence will: From the IAC minutes of the 4th December and the earlier CIA documents it appears clear that the Robertson Panel was the outcome of recommendation (a) of the IAC decision but that this formed part of a wider intended programme of action aimed at enabling rapid positive identification of UFOs from an air defense perspective (i.e. identifying actual Soviet aircraft from misidentified natural phenomena or other conventional objects) and a desire to reduce reporting of UFOs, which were seen as clogging up air defense communication channels and created the risk of exploitation of this effect. The inter-relationships between these wider aspects of the CIA’s recommendations and the Battelle Memorial Institute's study, culminating in Blue Book Special Report 14,〔Blue Book Special Report 14, 1955, Analysis of Reports of Unidentified Aerial Objects’, http://www.bluebookarchive.org〕 which identified a statistically significant difference between 'unknowns' and UFO reports that could subsequently be identified, or the study group referenced in a Canadian government document as operating as early as 1950 under the chairmanship of Dr Vannevar Bush, then head of the Joint Research and Development Board, to discover the ‘modus operandi’ of UFOs〔Memorandum to the Director of Telecommunications from Wilbert Smith, 21st November 1950, http://www.presidentialufo.com/old_site/top_secret_text.htm〕 are unclear. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)』 ■ウィキペディアで「Robertson Panel」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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